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FAR BEYOND THE SUBURBS of Metropolitan Manila, nestled 
in the rolling plains of the Central Luzon basin, the construction of 
the roadworks of the Alviera and Clark Green City (CGC) projects 
are now in full swing. Still surrounded by swathes of agricultural 
land and years away yet from completing their first phases of devel-
opment, both mega-projects have already been heralded as the 
most promising ventures of their kind within the Philippines today. 
Despite being in their infancy, in fact, both Alviera and CGC have 
been seen to form the very “next frontiers” of Philippine urbanism 
(Manila Standard 2014), introducing all at once the future growth 
hubs of the Central Luzon region, the nation’s very first “aerotrop-
olis” (Amojelar 2013), and new forms of sustainable urban devel-
opment in the Philippines.
But these two mega-projects are only an inkling of historic 
changes that await the Manila peri-urban fringe, if plans to decon-
gest the country’s National Capital Region (NCR) materialize. Owing 
to worsening dysfunctions in Manila mega-city life, the Philippine 
government adopted last September 2014 a “Mega Manila Dream 
Plan” for boosting growth clusters and transport networks in the 
surrounding peri-urban fringe (Japan International Cooperation 
Agency 2014). Meanwhile, a groundswell in large-scale, mixed-use 
townships by leading private developers has taken root in prov-
inces north and south of NCR (Pacis 2014). Trammeled amidst 
these trends, land on the Manila mega-urban region has come to 
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established and maintained, and of what prospects exist for real-
izing universal and democratic rights to the city.
Megaprojects and the Scalar Politics 
of Neoliberal Urbanism
Since the late 1980s, cities across developing Asia have witnessed 
an upsurge in efforts by market-based property firms and state 
bodies to restructure urban landscapes by means of large-scale, 
integrated “mega-projects” (Shatkin 2011, 80). Normally presented 
as a measure for shoring up “world class” economic opportunities, 
and operationalized as parcelized interventions, these large-scale 
ventures have, from the 2000s onwards, taken the form of mixed-use 
developments addressing objectives ranging from commercial 
to social and environmental goals (Strauch, Takano, and Hordijk 
2015, 178). Globalizing middle- and upper- classes, keen to flee the 
inconveniences of degraded urban arteries, have often been drawn 
to purveyed images of plush living and “progress” (Michel 2010, 
388–89), yet the emergence of such megaprojects has not always 
been seen in a favorable light. Numerous observers, for one, have 
noted that such ventures have often run counter to social concerns, 
particularly by intensifying socio-spatial divisions through gentrifi-
cation-driven displacement and the eviction of peripheral popula-
tions (Strauch, Takano, and Hordijk 2015, 177–78).
Yet these megaprojects have been only one means by which 
neoliberal urban governance has found expression in the cities of 
the Global South. Defined as an order of market-disciplinary socio-
economic regulation in which urban spaces have been transformed 
into strategic arenas for capital accumulation and market-oriented 
growth, neoliberal urbanism has entailed the remaking of cities as 
platforms for entrepreneurial forms of governance and unprece-
dented degrees of private sector involvement, if not control, over 
urban development trajectories (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 
2009, 57–58, 63). Yet, if widely associated with the marketization 
of housing and social services, the repurposing of urban admin-
istrative apparatuses toward attracting business investment, and 
the proliferation of privatized enclaves, neoliberal urban govern-
ance regimes have just as significantly entailed the reshuffling 
of the territorial scales of state power (59–62). In tandem with 
fore as a frontier zone for market-oriented mega-project develop-
ment, yet also a spatial platform for the creation of “next gener-
ation” built landscapes that are proliferating across East Asia 
(Webster 2014, 321–23).
This chapter investigates transformations in the geographies 
of governance that have been catalyzed by these mega-projects. 
Based on mixed-method research of the Alviera and CGC projects, 
I unravel how the realization of such ventures has gone hand-in-
hand with the formation of new constellations of power, territory 
and governance processes, creating a special window for probing 
the dynamics of urban spatial production within developing coun-
tries like the Philippines. However, if partly due to the very features 
of these mega-projects—their non-routine nature, the sheer scale 
of costs and risks that they impose, and their disruptive tenden-
cies (Altschuler and Luberoff 2003, 4, 267)—these governance 
transformations have also resulted from scale-related challenges 
that have been faced by their proponents. Thus, I argue that a full 
understanding of these mega-projects’ development efforts must 
grapple with the state rescaling processes and the scale-manipu-
lating strategies that market- and state-based actors have deployed 
in their bids to secure control over land and the production of new 
urban space. 
Yet these mega-project processes have not occurred in an 
open, free-form milieu: rather, they have been situated within the 
Philippines’ prevailing strains of market-oriented urban govern-
ance. While the neoliberal restructuring of the Philippine political 
economy since the 1980s has resulted in deep-seated developmental 
doldrums, it has also precipitated a long-term “creative destruc-
tion” of the practices, mechanisms, and institutions governing 
space and urban development (Bello et al. 2014, 9–10, 55). Nowhere 
has this recalibration been more arresting than in the now-prolif-
erating mega-projects of the Manila mega-urban fringe, where 
sclerotic governance regimes over the “losers” and “winners” of the 
Philippines’ “new” economy have been cast into stark relief with one 
another. All told, the significance of these mega-projects extends far 
beyond themselves: they tell an even broader story of how power 
relations are now exercised over the Philippines’ economy of space, 
of how governing regimes over new “world-class” urban spaces are 
4 Great Transformations 5JERIK CRUZ
relative socio-spatial power positions of different actors, and how 
institutional “command lines” of authority are drawn over territo-
ries (Swyngedouw 2000, 70–71), scale can even be said to consti-
tute a socially-mediated apparatus of power—congealing and 
extending relations of power and control among variegated social 
forces. Within such understandings of scalar politics, all socio- 
political practices and processes are instead viewed as having 
indelible scalar dimensions, so that manipulating and leveraging 
these scalar features can have vital repercussions on the realiza-
tion of the agendas of different agents, movements and organiza-
tions (MacKinnon 2010, 29–30, 32–33). 
In the parlance of Smith (1993; 2004), for example, actors that 
are socially and politically handicapped at a given scale can seek 
to jump into different scalar settings where political opportunities 
and the balance-of-power may be more favorable for their activities. 
Likewise, other agents can seek to bend the existing scalar features of 
given social activities, disentangling the links between certain prac-
tices at given scalar frames, so as to suit the fulfillment of their inter-
ests. Through such multi-pronged scalar strategies, different agents 
in different spatial-institutional contexts are able to produce new 
gestalts of scale in the course of mega-project development, in order 
to temporarily crystallize certain geometries of power and govern-
ance (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002, 542; MacKinnon 
2010, 31). In fact, as will be shown later, the deployment of such 
strategies has been an indispensable feature of urban mega-project 
implementation, not only to better advance the strategic agendas of 
private and public sector developers, but also as a means of coping 
with incoherencies brought about by the Philippines’ long transition 
to a regime of neoliberal urban governance.
Tropic of Neoliberalism: Neoliberal Urbanism and 
Megaproject Making in the Peri-Urban Philippines
The strategic manipulation of scalar frames, especially in rela-
tion to state institutional structures and the consolidation of neolib-
eral governance regimes, have been manifested to an exceptional 
degree in the Philippines since the 1980s. If couched at the time in 
the discourse of democratization following the Marcos dictator-
ship, this rescaling process entailed the passage of the country’s 
efforts to recast cities along lines of market-based growth, state 
structures that had previously been centralized, nationally stand-
ardized, and oriented to welfarist or developmentalist objectives 
have been subjected to various grades of decentralization, place-
based customization, and the enshrining of global competitiveness 
as the principal aim of policy intervention (Klink and Denaldi 2012, 
547–48). 
At the heart of all these processes lies a historic shift in which 
neoliberal urbanism and privately-driven megaprojects have 
brought to fore new geographies of governance. As analysts have 
observed, implementers of contemporary urban megaprojects 
have commonly been granted “exceptionalist” measures exempting 
them from the authority of conventional state bodies and regula-
tions, while endowing them with special powers of intervention, 
decision-making, and policy-formulation (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, 
and Rodriguez 2002, 543; Kennedy et al. 2014, 13, 37). Justified in 
terms of commercial and technocratic prerogatives, unaccount-
able and exclusionary management regimes surrounding the 
governance of these ventures have increasingly prevailed, whether 
in the form of public-private partnerships (PPPs) between corpo-
rate firms and state organizations; autonomous and quasi-private 
parastatal agencies; closed-door networks of bureaucrats, business 
elites, professional consultancies, and technical experts; or token 
public participation exercises in which citizens are denied real insti-
tutional power to affect decisions concerning the governance of 
entire cities (Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002, 565–66). 
All in all, such exceptionalist mechanisms have further undermined 
already-sharp democratic deficits in urban governance.
Equally noteworthy, the existence of such governance dynamics 
attests to how questions of scale are cardinal concerns for the 
development of urban mega-projects. Though typically understood 
as the focal setting at which spatial boundaries are defined for 
specific social processes (Agnew 1997, 100), subsequent recogni-
tion in human geography that scalar boundaries are socially-con-
structed, relational, and fluid yet objectively-inherited phenomena 
has drawn attention to how the framing of scalar realities can 
themselves be factors in how socio-political processes play out 
(Born and Purcell 2006, 197–99). Through their role in shaping the 
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over nominally public urban spaces and develop them into private-
ly-run enclaves (Murphy and Hogan 2012, 23, 25). Unsurprisingly, 
the country’s urban form has displayed ever-higher degrees of 
socio-spatial fragmentation between high-performing, globally-con-
nected nodes of the urban economy, and more publicly-neglected 
segments of Philippine cities, epitomized by the 500 major slum 
communities of Metro Manila (Ragrario 2003). For the most part, 
a “bypass-implant” character of developer-driven projects such as 
gated enclaves, privatized business districts, and privately-operated 
interconnecting infrastructures has obtained—with commercial 
developments tending to “bypass” all zones of unwanted urban 
“excess,” while “implanting” new spaces for globally-connected 
consumption and accumulation (Shatkin 2008, 384, 388). 
These same trends have also been increasingly displayed in 
the peri-urbanization dynamics of the Manila Mega-Urban Region 
(MUR)—a roughly 12,000 km2 conurbation consisting of NCR and 
parts of six surrounding provinces, which has been estimated to 
be the fourth most populous urban region in the world in 2015 
(Demographia 2015, 20). Home to some of the foremost farming 
regions of the Philippines, large expanses of the MUR have already 
been buffeted by waves of land-use change since the early 1980s, 
usually through the mushrooming of SEZ’s, leisure estates, but most 
especially, private residential enclaves (Kelly 1998, 35–39). More 
recently, the longest ongoing real estate boom in the Philippines’ 
post-dictatorship history has tilted peri-urbanization trends in 
the MUR toward mega-project development, with advances in the 
scale, sophistication, master-planning and financing capabilities 
of property developers lending more and more prominence to 
the establishment of large-scale, mixed-use ventures on the urban 
fringe (Webster 2014, 323). Beginning with the 2007 unveiling of 
Ayala Land Inc.’s 1,600-hectare Nuvali township in Canlubang, 
Laguna, the mixed-use township trend has continued to garner 
momentum, with observers declaring 2015 as “the year of town-
ships” on account of at least 11 such ventures being developed 
across the country (Lamudi 2015). 
Yet despite buoyant expectations, institutional impediments 
have still threatened the realization of such townships. As noted 
in studies of urban mega-projects across Asia, the most common 
Local Government Code in 1991, which decentralized an entire 
continuum of governance functions, including in urban planning, 
land-use management, and the power to enter into joint ventures 
and PPP’s, down from the national toward subnational levels (Porio 
2012, 11–13). Within the National Capital Region, this downscaling 
resulted in the dismantling of the cronyism-ridden Metro Manila 
Commission into a weaker Metro Manila Development Authority, 
limited to coordinating the urban governance functions of its 
constituent local government units (LGUs) (Michel 2010, 390–91).2
Even more striking has been the rise of new “exceptional” bodies 
oriented towards attracting investment and typified by market-
friendly modes of regulation. In 1995, the Philippine government 
legislated the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act, making the country 
the first in the world to allow the creation of privately-administered 
SEZs as separate customs and investment-friendly territories (McKay 
2006, 210–11). Autonomous Freeports have likewise been created 
by legislation over lands spanning tens of thousands of hectares 
across the country, with unprecedented powers of eminent domain, 
developing and regulating utilities, public services, and infrastruc-
ture, and planning as well as managing allocated territories (Bello 
et al. 2014, 94). No less important, through the Bases Conversion 
Act of 1992, former military bases were placed under the sole juris-
diction of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), 
with powers, among others, of selling and leasing such lands to the 
private sector; overseeing urban planning and management within 
them, and constructing, owning, leasing, operating, and maintaining 
public utilities and infrastructure facilities (Ordoñez 2015, 36, 42–43). 
In the highly class-stratified Philippine context, systematic 
neoliberalization has served to even further entrench the country’s 
privately-oriented and geographically-uneven dynamics of prop-
erty development (Michel 2010, 386). While state units have failed 
to respond effectively to the country’s intractable urban woes, 
private conglomerates have secured unrivalled heights of control 
over urban planning and administration processes (Shatkin 2008, 
398). Labelled by observers as evincing a pattern of neo-patrimo-
nial trends in urban governance, the demonstrated weakness of 
the Philippine state in performing urban governance functions has 
enabled an oligarchy of family-linked companies to seize control 
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post-war Philippine history. To begin with, the firm was chiefly 
responsible for developing its former Hacienda Makati throughout 
the 1950s into the Philippines’ leading central business, diplomatic, 
and financial nerve center, setting a gold standard for Philippine 
property developers for years to come (Michel 2010, 389). 
causes for the failure of these ventures has been in consolidating 
large-scale tracts of urban land, protracted local resistance against 
project implementation, and oftentimes the unreliability and 
ineffectiveness of local governments (Shatkin 2011, 86–89). On 
one hand, even while incentivizing entrepreneurial governance 
approaches, local governance quality amidst decentralization has 
remained uneven, and improvements in lagging LGU’s have been 
sluggish (Capuno 2005, 28). On the other, the makeup of Philippine 
urban and peri-urban land markets have also posed persis-
tent challenges to large-scale land acquisition and conversion 
processes. With a fragmented, inefficient, unreliable, and corrup-
tion-prone land administration system stretching across nineteen 
different state agencies, such markets have proven a fertile ground 
for conflict, with the same plot of land often harboring competing 
claims on the basis of different property regimes (Chikiamko and 
Fabella 2011, 133).
Confronted with these hurdles, mega-project proponents have 
usually found it necessary to “strategically localize” their devel-
opment activities by meeting the needs of and simultaneously 
influencing political, institutional, and social conditions particu-
larly at the local level (Coe and Lee 2006, 63–64). Far from simply 
“place-shopping” among pre-constructed sites, developers have 
systematically intervened across multiple scalar terrains not 
only in order to establish their leverage within local institutional 
processes and relations, but also to proactively reconstitute such 
conditions (McKay 2006, 8–9). How then have these above-men-
tioned challenges affected the Alviera and CGC projects, and how 
have local governance processes over land resources and urban 
space been transformed amidst project proponents’ efforts in 
order to surmount these constraints? We now turn to addressing 
these questions.
Ayala Land’s Alviera: In the Shadows 
of “Acting Government”
By acclamation the Philippines’ premier real estate developer, 
and a subsidiary of one of the country’s oldest family-owned 
conglomerates, Ayala Land Inc. (ALI) can lay claim to being a 
consistent pioneer of urban development trends throughout 
Fig.1. Entrance of Alviera as of February 2016
 Source: Author
Fig.2. Ongoing Construction of Alviera as of February 2016
 Source: Author
10 Great Transformations 11JERIK CRUZ
commercial hubs to Metro Manila (iMoney.ph 2015). Yet in reality, 
the venture’s operations on the ground have been far more compli-
cated. For one, the capacity of the Porac local state remains anemic 
across practically all business-relevant areas: as of April 2014, Porac 
was ranked 826th out of 978 municipalities in the country’s Cities 
and Municipalities Competitiveness Index, suffering particularly in 
the categories of economic dynamism (940th) and infrastructure 
(853rd), but still also performing far below median levels for govern-
ment efficiency (667th)4 (National Competitiveness Council 2014).
But even more serious has been Alviera’s enmeshment with local 
land disputes—especially in relation to the 761.1-hectare lot that 
ALI’s JV partner, LLHI, claims to have acquired by a 2003 Deed of 
Sale. This purchase, however, has been censured by residents and 
critics as a case of dispossession, having involved lands inhabited 
and tilled by 1,500 residents from local farming communities. In 
fact, certifications from the Barangay Council of Hacienda Dolores 
attest to many of these families’ first settlement within the area as 
far back as 1835 (Jimenez-David 2014). Despite this, the resulting 
land dispute has witnessed LLHI security forces and unidentified 
figures committing systematic human rights violations since 2011 
against residents, including evictions, demolitions, crop destruc-
tion, intimidation, assaults, and extrajudicial killings (Hernandez 
2014).
Meanwhile, though the 1,180-hectare lot of ALI (which the 
company purchased from the once nationally-influential Puyat 
family and their Manila Bank group in 2012) has been repeatedly 
emphasized not to suffer from land problems, critics maintain that 
the ongoing construction of Alviera has actually entailed an illegal 
conversion process, having been missing a formal conversion 
order from the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (Carranza 
2016). Likewise, rural justice advocates from Pampanga contend 
that the project’s development has flouted a 1990’s application of 
Hacienda Dolores residents to have the same land plot covered by 
the government land reform program. In the recollection of such 
advocates, the entire estate was originally intended by DAR to be 
developed into a model agrarian reform community, though efforts 
to this end were stymied by the resistance of the Puyats’ property 
managers and the long-term impacts of the Mt. Pinatubo eruption 
Since then, ALI has replicated such feats in now-iconic projects, 
the most recent being its 1,600-hectare Nuvali township in 2007 in 
Laguna province (Ayala Land 2015, 25–27). 
Hailed by pundits to be Ayala Land’s most ambitious initiative 
since Nuvali, the 1,180-hectare Alviera project in Porac, Pampanga 
is a mixed-use, master-planned township that is envisioned to 
eventually serve as the growth center of the whole of the Central 
Luzon region (Dumlao 2014). To be developed over a twenty-five- 
to thirty-year period, the first phase of the project, from 2016 to 
2019, will involve the establishment of three residential commu-
nities, two educational institutions, a high-end country club, 
and a 31-hectare industrial park (Montealegre 2014). With the 
Subic-Clark-Tarlac expressway (SCTEX) passing right through its 
property, and being strategically located close to the refurbished 
Clark International Airport, the mega-project has been projected 
to become a central district of a looming “aerotropolis” in CL 
(Philippine Daily Inquirer 2014). Likewise, Alviera is to be distin-
guished as a new “green township,” by preserving the project site’s 
mountainous environment for ecotourism purposes while incor-
porating eco-friendly urban landscapes (Vibar 2014). 
This focus on Alviera’s development as an urban and nature 
hub highlights Alviera’s being constructed in the town of Porac,3 
specifically within the barangays of Hacienda Dolores and Sapang 
Uwak, where communities of lowland farmers and Aeta indige-
nous peoples (IPs) reside. In these areas, the project will consol-
idate separate property contributions of 1,180-hectares from ALI 
and 761.1-hectares from Leonio Land Holdings Inc. (LLHI), which 
had acquired property in the town even earlier (Ayala Land 2015). 
Both companies have formed a JV company for the project called 
Nuevocentro Inc., in which a 55 percent (ALI) /45 percent (LLHI) 
profit-sharing scheme has been arranged (Magturo 2014; PEZA 
2014). 
Thwarting the Ayala Model in Porac? 
From a project standpoint, the reported performance of Alviera 
has exceeded expectations: on the merit of the project’s ambition 
and initial success to date, Porac has been heralded as one of 
the leading “next-wave cities” providing alternative business and 
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Secondly, ALI and LLHI have been able to exercise considerable 
influence over the crafting of the municipality’s Comprehensive 
Land Use Plan (CLUP). Starting in 2005 with LLHI and 2012 with 
ALI, both companies have prompted major post-hoc adjustments in 
plans to accommodate the mega-project, by contributing substan-
tial inputs and expertise to municipal planners (Lansangan 2016). 
One critical outcome of this has been the explicit recognition that 
the CLUP has given to the Alviera project as Porac’s “new economic 
center” (Municipality of Porac 2016, 42). As can be observed from 
fig. 4.3, the prominence of Alviera—located at the center of munic-
ipality’s land terrain and adjacent to various proposed road inter-
changes—corroborates its privileged status in the town’s planned 
land-use regime. Since CLUP adjustments are required for the 
passage of new zoning ordinances, these new features of Porac’s 
land-use plan effectively produce a quasi-legal instrument for 
facilitating local land conversion and fostering a broader growth-
driven agenda. 
(Enriquez 2016). Hence, while no legal proceedings are presently 
hounding ALI’s property, dormant legal risks have remained.
The Scalar Politics of Intervention:  
From Coalitions to Land Acquisition
Amidst such impediments, ALI has had to undertake unprec-
edented measures to craft more favorable conditions for Alviera’s 
development. This has evidently been the case in the firm’s coali-
tion-building efforts, which have reportedly garnered the support 
of key power-brokers within Pampanga province, such as the 
governor of Pampanga, the present congresswoman of the second 
District of Pampanga ( former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo), 
former Senator Lito Lapid (a resident of Porac), and the Pampanga 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (comprised by the province’s 
business elite), who have each contributed to the mega-project’s 
development (see fig. 4.2) (Mapiles 2015; Ayala manager 2016). 
Former president Arroyo especially has been recounted by project 
stakeholders to be a vital mediator of talks between LGU officials, 
ALI and prospective investors—and was even, in the recollection of 
Porac’s mayor, the key agent who facilitated ALI’s entry into Porac 
starting in 2010 (dela Cruz 2016). 
But the extensiveness of ALI’s engagements goes far beyond 
the extension of a multi-level project coalition. On one hand, with 
communities in peri-urban settings reportedly being prone to 
“insular” outlooks, the Alviera project has witnessed attempts by 
ALI to cultivate supportive relational webs with the LGU and local 
communities, with ALI’s managers on the ground often having to 
comport themselves in a fashion reminiscent of Philippine landed 
elites of yore through gestures such as donating to local festivals, 
attending weddings, sponsoring dinners and local functions, as 
well as becoming godparents to children of key residents (Ayala 
executive 2016). Apparently, the ability of ALI personnel to conduct 
themselves in this quasi-patron manner, and to derive tactical 
advantage from it, has been a prized asset in Ayala’s Strategic 
Landbank Management Group. The said group has even reportedly 
stopped hiring business school graduates from Ivy League univer-
sities on the basis of their lacking the necessary flexibility for such 
activities (Alviera manager 2016).
Fig.3. Porac Map with proposed Alviera project in the revised CLUP
 Source: Municipality of Porac (2016)
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the property were non-agricultural, untenanted, poorly suited 
to cultivated crops, and also features an excessive slope of 18 
degrees (Hernandez 2014, 1–3). Central to procuring the order 
was a compromise agreement LLHI had cobbled with the officers 
of a local irrigators association, Aguman, which consisted of local 
farmers who had been forced to settle in the LLHI-claimed lands 
due to post-eruption lahar flows in the 1990s. Entailing the cessa-
tion of efforts for land reform coverage in exchange for a 30-hectare 
residential land concession from LLHI, this agreement, however, 
has been impugned to have been forged without proper consul-
tation of the organization’s membership while being out-of-odds 
with the facts on the ground (Mendoza 2016; Hernandez 2014, 3).
However flawed, the order has nevertheless allowed LLHI, 
with support from LGU officials, to drive forward land conversion 
proceedings against local settlers, who have reorganized them-
selves into a local association entitled the Aniban ng Nakakaisang 
Mamamayan ng Hacienda Dolores (Aniban). In 2011, the Mayor 
of Porac granted LLHI the authority to fence their land despite 
protests by residents and opposition municipal councilors; in 2012, 
a municipal ordinance reclassifying the land-use of LLHI’s prop-
erty was issued despite lacking legally-mandated public consul-
tation. Even more troubling, in the midst of demolitions, intim-
idation episodes, and outright killings, the municipal police has 
been consistently reported to turn a blind eye to reports of human 
rights violations (Tapang 2016; Mendoza 2016; Carranza 2016). In 
all this, LLHI has revealed itself as adopting more overtly patri-
monial methods than ALI, having harnessed both clientelist and 
coercive techniques of asserting control over territory that have 
been standard fare among traditional Philippine political elites.
“Heroes at the Backstage”:  
Emerging Power Geometries in Porac
As the above discussion has shown, the development dynamics 
of Alviera have hinged upon ALI’s harnessing a cornucopia of 
scalar strategies in the areas of inter-scalar coalition formation, 
planning, land acquisition, and consolidating supportive firm-local 
relations. Yet the most consequential impacts of these and other 
strategies have been its reshaping of local power networks which 
Just as riveting has been the CLUP’s proposed development 
trajectory, which has buttressed ALI’s commanding position in 
the town’s local economy. This is most apparent in the revised 
CLUP’s endorsement of a public and private partnership model for 
undertaking eco-tourism projects—an area which the plan repeat-
edly identifies as the emerging industry within the municipality 
(Municipality of Porac 2016, 26, 34, 38). Though not mentioned 
explicitly in the document, this proposed policy focus promises 
to secure significant potential returns for ALI, given that the only 
access route to one of the town’s main tourism attractions—
the Miyamit falls—is located right within ALI’s property (Ayala 
manager 2016). 
The most pressing concerns of ALI and LLHI, however, have 
been their efforts to insulate the lands acquired for Alviera from 
coverage by the government’s land reform program. On one hand, 
vital to insulating Ayala Land’s 1,180-hectare lot has been its star-
tling mode of acquisition. Secured in 2012, the land transaction 
occurred at a time when the Philippines’ Central Bank (BSP) 
had become the effective administrator of the land parcel (Ayala 
Manager 2016), as the parcel in question had been mortgaged to 
the BSP by the Puyat family’s Manila Bank (and eventually fore-
closed) in the years after the Asian Financial Crisis (Dizon 2016). 
While details as to the exact arrangement between ALI, Manila 
Bank, and BSP are murky, this process has—in line with an August 
10, 2012 Legal Opinion of the Philippines’ Department of Justice—
ultimately resulted in an effective exemption of the parcel from 
land reform coverage. On the basis of the BSP’s being granted 
fiscal and administrative autonomy by the New Central Bank Act 
of 1993, the Legal Opinion stated, any mandatory requirement for 
BSP to transfer foreclosed agricultural lands that have come under 
its authority for land redistribution would constitute an undue 
infringement of the Central Bank’s unique “discretion to allocate 
and utilize its resources” (Alegado 2012; Dizon 2016).
In comparison to this exceptionalist acquisition tactic of 
ALI, LLHI’s maneuvers have been more locally-focused. Having 
purchased its 761.1-hectare property in 2003 in anticipation of 
SCTEX’s completion, the company afterwards secured an exemp-
tion order from DAR in 2006 on the basis that the lands within 
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modes of governance, as well as to granting planning, policy and 
administrative concessions to key investors (Ortega 2012, 1125, 
1128). Collectively, such institutional dynamics have undermined 
the Porac local state’s bargaining position vis-à-vis prospective 
investors, while simultaneously incentivizing stronger public-pri-
vate collaborations in order to compensate for perceived govern-
ance shortfalls, whether in employment generation, local enter-
prise growth, and overall governance.5
But no less decisive has been the reputational capital that the 
firm has been able to amass for itself through the success of its 
previous ventures, including the technical and managerial compe-
tencies that have enabled its personnel to demonstrate expertise, 
and not to mention the capacity of its officers to adapt to relational 
dynamics at variegated contexts yet still attain de facto local lead-
ership. In this, ALI’s ability to project seniority, competency, and 
legitimacy in its relations with its “junior” partners has been of 
cardinal importance, having purportedly relied upon their consen-
sual appeals for support. By successfully garnering such positions 
of local hegemonic leadership, ALI, in short, is able to relatively 
ensure LGU’s “spontaneous” seeking to be mentored by them, even 
if in so doing the company is able to reproduce and deepen the 
conditions of its influence.
It may indeed happen that such interventions by ALI into local 
urban governance may offer the Porac government capacity-aug-
mentation opportunities—yet what should be clear is that ALI has 
been remarkably adept at leveraging such opportunities for longer-
term advantage. Coupled with the savvy of ALI staff at projecting 
themselves into positions of local hegemonic leadership, the firm 
has been able to systematically consolidate a new spatio-institu-
tional gestalt of governance surrounding Alviera in which they 
are able to indirectly mold governance activities over the produc-
tion of urban space by means of soft interventions of competency 
provision, administrative guidance, and seeming beneficence. In 
producing these new strains of governance, ALI’s influence over 
the municipality’s policy and development trajectory is itself 
produced and reproduced. Insofar as wide institutional dispari-
ties between ALI and the LGU continue to exist, and insofar as the 
municipality continues to be located in a setting of neoliberalized 
have deepened ALI’s leverage over core governance processes. In 
discussing ALI’s role in local urban governance processes, an Ayala 
officer confided:
We shoulder all these—the [governance] responsibilities. Let’s say we 
develop this [a mixed-use estate]: anything that happens here is our call. It’s 
supposed to be the call of the government. We’re just supposed to develop 
buildings and subdivisions within. But since the government’s not the one 
developing, we basically become acting government. . . . Basically we are the 
“heroes at the backstage,” as far as government functions are concerned. 
Sometimes they [the LGU] don’t know any better. So we do it, so we assist 
them. That’s how it goes in the Philippines. (Ayala manager 2016) 
What accounts for this position as “acting government” within 
the territory of Alviera and the broader Porac municipality? ALI, 
undoubtedly, has profited from its immense financial muscle 
to contract high-level services of all kinds (e.g., security, legal, 
promotional), as well as its ability to hone strategic linkages with 
key influentials, such as Pampanga Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (PamCham), Pampanga’s governor, Porac’s mayor, and 
especially former president Arroyo. And yet, based on the accounts 
of informants, even more decisive has been the company’s “soft,” 
flexible methods of projecting and consolidating influence. Ayala 
insists that it “never controls” and “never fights” LGU players (Ayala 
manager 2016). Instead, the company portrays its manner of influ-
encing as entailing a more indirect guiding and even mentoring 
presence vis-à-vis local state officers, in which ALI seemingly 
assumes the role of a senior partner to the LGU in fulfilling of 
governance responsibilities: “We try our best to mentor them so 
that in the future, they know already what to do—but that’s already 
ideal since they always need our assistance. We mold them to think 
like us” (Ayala manager 2016).
Yet throughout the Alviera episode, ALI’s mentoring strategy 
to influencing local processes has apparently hinged upon two 
preconditions. It depends, for one, on the abiding proneness of peri-
urban LGU’s—in the context of neoliberalized urban governance—
to actively seeking capacity augmentation from non-state actors 
such as ALI, to adopting more entrepreneurial, investor-friendly 
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inter-urban competition, there is every reason to expect that Porac 
local government will be continually consigned to be ALI’s junior 
partner in such urban governance collaborations. 
BCDA’s Clark Green City: Redeveloping the Developers?
Over the past two decades, the Bases Conversion and 
Development Authority has come to prominence as one of the 
most successful government-owned and controlled corporations 
(GOCCs) in the Philippines. Established in 1992, the authority 
claims to be the single largest landholder in the country today, 
having inherited 41,500 hectares of former military bases across 
Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, and Metro Manila (BCDA 2013, 4, 
8–9), which was tasked to convert into SEZs and mixed-use urban 
growth centers (House of Representatives 2010, 3-4). Independent 
of guaranteed budget appropriations, and directed by the BCDA 
Act to “encourage the active participation of the private sector,” 
BCDA has also been noteworthy for harnessing private sector 
collaborations as one of its chief instruments for project devel-
opment (BCDA 2013b, 18). Yet if influenced by market-oriented 
policy approaches, its operations have also been leagues away 
from patrimonial forms of urban governance in the Philippines. 
Owing to high pressures for sequestering the agency from corrup-
tion at the time of its establishment, highly-qualified technocrats 
have been regularly appointed to the agency’s Board of Directors 
and management—all of whom have remained answerable only to 
the Office of the President (Ordoñez 2015, 40). 
These features of BCDA have been central in the agency’s CGC 
project—the agency’s most significant venture since converting 
Fort Bonifacio into Bonifacio Global City in the 1990s. Spanning 
9,450 hectares of the former Clark airbase in the municipalities of 
Capas and Bamban in Tarlac province, the mega-project is aimed 
by BCDA to become the Philippines’ first smart, green and disas-
ter-resilient metropolis (BCDA 2013, 22–23). Planned to incorpo-
rate numerous urban functions, such as a financial and commer-
cial center, green industrial zones, residential areas, districts for 
schools/universities and backup government offices, and urban 
farmlands as well as forest areas, and to be supported by networks 
of already-existing and forthcoming infrastructures including 
Fig. 4. Construction of Clark Green City as of February 2016
 Source: Author
Fig. 5. Clark Green City’s Planned Location and Land Use Distribution as of 2016
 Source: BCDA
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these LGUs’ jurisdiction since 1947, which the passage of the Bases 
Conversion Act in 1992 sustained (Municipality of Capas 2011, 4–8). 
Accordingly, on June 9, 2014, a hearing of the Special Committee on 
Bases Conversion at the Philippines’ House of Representatives was 
held at the behest of Tarlac LGU officials, where various misgivings 
were voiced concerning the project. Based on their testimonies, 
neither the congressmen, mayors, nor governor of Tarlac prov-
ince were reportedly consulted by BCDA throughout the planning 
process for CGC (House of Representatives 2014, 12, 18).
Paralleling LGU grievances has been the threat of antici-
pated displacement for townsfolk residing within CGC-spanned 
areas. Though BCDA has been granted legal stewardship of the 
lands comprising the whole CGC area, a considerable portion of 
project lands has already been occupied by settler households, 
some of whom even claim to have resided within the area since 
even before the creation of the airbase. Based on local surveys, 
around 500 farming families stand to be relocated if the develop-
ment proceeds—though if non-agricultural households within the 
area are included, the figure rises to nearly 20,000 (Letana 2016). 
Many of these same territories have also been among the ancestral 
domains of indigenous Aeta tribes, whose control over the lands 
has been severely disrupted since the creation of Clark airbase 
during the American colonial period. While such indigenous popu-
lations have not been able to regain complete possession of their 
original ancestral lands, two Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title 
(CADT) have nonetheless been issued for their communities in 
Capas since the 1990s: the Aeta Sambal and Abellen area (6,671 
hectares) and the Aeta Mag-Antsi area (4312 hectares). Both of 
these CADT areas overlap with the military reservation of Capas 
(House of Representatives 2014, 16).
Finally, as revealed by BCDA informants, another quandary 
faced by the project concerned the development of the CGC 
master plans. Developed with a wide range of experts, the master 
plan ultimately establishes the frame of the agency’s land bidding 
processes with potential business partners, allowing it to evaluate 
different developers based on their overall capacity to bring the 
plan to fruition (Ordoñez 2015, 41–43, 51). However, while the 
initial conceptual master plan for CGC was completed in 2013 
SCTEX, the Clark International Airport and future Clark Rail from 
CGC to Metro Manila, the venture is positioned, like ALI’s Alviera 
project, to become a core node of a budding Clark-centered aero-
tropolis (Lee 2015, 188).
Beyond its metropolitan-scale aspirations, CGC is envisioned 
as offering nothing less than a new model of urbanism for the 
Philippines. As the project’s name suggests, it will be the country’s 
first full-fledged eco-city, and will integrate a plethora of sustain-
ability features such as green spaces, urban farms, green build-
ings, renewable energy, and sustainable transport into its design 
and operations (BCDA 2013, 22–23). But even more momentous 
has been BCDA’s attempt in planning CGC to directly foster more 
inclusive forms of urban development: at full development, CGC is 
foreseen to house around 800,000 workers in “slum-free” fashion, 
which BCDA plans to achieve by providing affordable, decent, and 
quality housing (Sun Star Pampanga 2015).6
At present, the mega-project’s master plan envisions CGC’s 
development as a 50 year-long affair, though the first phase of 
the development until 2019 aims to construct two industrial 
zones, two mixed-use lots, a “global campus” of the University of 
the Philippines, a public park district, and roadworks all within 
a 1,300-hectare land area (BCDA 2014). These components of the 
first phase of CGC are slated for accomplishment through several 
PPP mechanisms (e.g., joint ventures), in which most of financing 
and risk allocation will be borne by the private sector (Bingcang 
2016).
Unrest in the Baselands: Community and LGU 
Opposition, and Master-Planning Dilemmas
With CGC’s master plan having been fully approved by the 
Philippine government last May 29, 2014 (Locsin 2014), it is still too 
early, as of writing, to provide a detailed assessment of the project’s 
impact to date. Nonetheless, considerable stumbling blocks to the 
project have surfaced. Firstly, though the governance conundrums 
of the Capas and Bamban LGUs have not been as pronounced as 
Porac’s, CGC’s development has nevertheless created friction with 
officials of these municipalities. These tensions concern how the 
military base lands encompassed by CGC have been excluded from 
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remains as seamless as possible with the mega-project (Casanova 
2016; Bingcang 2016). In 2015, for one, BCDA sponsored the attend-
ance of the mayors and planning officers of Capas and Bamban 
in an urban planning training program at Nanyang Technological 
University in Singapore for upgrading their municipalities’ urban 
planning capacities. 
The BCDA-created TWG, in addition, also seems to have been 
the venue in which responses to the land claims of populations 
within CGC areas have been discussed. On the end of the indig-
enous Aeta, the NCIP has affirmed a commitment from BCDA to 
first solicit the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of any indigenous 
community that will be directly affected by CGC-related develop-
ment processes (Sunggod 2016). At the same time, however, BCDA 
officials assert that the boundaries of CGC were explicitly delin-
eated in such a way so as not to overlap with lands covered by 
the IP’s CADTs in the military reservation (Casanova 2016); for this 
purpose, the agency reportedly contracted a surveyor in November 
2013, partly to segregate all CADT areas in the vicinity from the 
by a consortium of PROS Architects and Woodfields Consultants, 
critical flaws were soon discerned. In particular, the most glaring 
weakness of the initial plan lay in miscalculations of the gross floor 
area (GFA) of the different land uses in the project, which had a 
deleterious domino effect on plans and forecasts for items like 
utilities, population, finance, and investment. Additionally, it was 
characterized by an emphasis on intensive infrastructural devel-
opment and a non-compact layout for CGC districts, which would 
have contradicted the sustainability commitments of CGC (Letana 
2016).
The Scalar Politics of Intervention:  
Land Settlements to International Expertise
On account of these challenges, BCDA, similar to ALI’s own 
efforts in Alviera, has had to engage in intensive local interven-
tion processes. In response to LGU tensions, the authority agreed 
to formulating a technical working group (TWG) following the 
congressional hearing that has since functioned as a steering 
committee by decision makers located across different government 
levels. Chaired by Tarlac’s provincial governor, and composed of 
representatives from BCDA, local executives and congress persons 
of Tarlac, the National Housing Authority, the National Commission 
for Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as well as local farmers’ and indig-
enous peoples’ associations, the TWG has been said to have held 
regular consultative meetings as a means for fostering inter-organ-
ization consensus on projects (Sun Star Pampanga, 2016).
As it appears, the success of the TWG has been borne out in the 
reversal of the views of Tarlac officials: from being a vocal critic of 
the project, the former mayor of Capas has since become one of 
its boosters, and was among those who attended CGC’s ground-
breaking last April 11, 2016 (see fig. 5.3) (Balita 2016). Joining 
such officials in their active promotion of the project, moreover, 
was former President Aquino himself, whom some in BCDA have 
credited to be CGC’s “number one marketing agent” in interna-
tional venues in the past administration (Bingcang 2016). Similarly, 
BCDA’s interventions apropos LGU’s have also extended into the 
creation of a long-term program of governance capacity-building 
in order to ensure that the broader region surrounding CGC 
Fig. 6. CGC’s Groundbreaking, featuring BCDA’s President (first from left), 
Philippine President Aquino (second from left), BCDA’s Chairperson (third 
from left), the Philippine Public Works Secretary (fourth from left), and 
Capas’ Mayor (fifth from left), 2016 
 Source: Joseph Vidal / Malacañang Photo Bureau (2016)
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for affected farmers (Orejas 2015; 2016). This shift in resistance, in 
turn, has effectively allowed roadwork construction processes to 
begin proceeding for the project (see fig. 5.4).
Lastly, shortfalls in the PROS and Woodfields master plan like-
wise prompted the employment of multi-level strategic responses 
by the agency. Following the approval of the project by former 
President Aquino on May 2014 ( for which in-house corrections to 
the CGC master plan were undertaken), BCDA launched an open 
international competition for the optimization of the CGC concep-
tual master plan in mid-December 2014.8 More recently, BCDA 
inked a JV agreement with the Japan Overseas Infrastructure 
Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development 
(JOIN) last March 2016 for crafting a more detailed CGC Master 
Development Plan (Letana 2016; Bingcang 2016). Not only is JOIN’s 
involvement in CGC’s master planning expected to assure poten-
tial locators that the mega-project will fulfill the standards of 
the Japanese government; the said entity has begun encouraging 
Japanese investors in the Philippines to locate within the CGC area, 
while committing to help in garnering additional infrastructure 
funding from the Japanese government (Bingcang 2016). By such 
means, BCDA has contracted additional capacities and advanced 
its international network embeddedness by bypassing local enti-
ties for international-level actors.
Steering the Market: Emerging Power Geometries in CGC
These interventions reveal the central importance of BCDA’s 
realignment of initially-unfavorable conditions across a variety of 
scalar terrains. Yet in achieving each of these scalar interventions, 
BCDA has also begun to consolidate a marked position of influ-
ence over urban governance processes in CGC-proximate areas. As 
a BCDA architect narrates,
The vision for the LGUs is that since we do not want Clark Green City to 
be an island, unlike BGC [Bonifacio Global City], we want the neighboring 
LGUs to grow along with Clark Green City. . . . We want these LGUs to inte-
grate the Clark Green City development in their own plans. . . . By being a 
model agency, and building a model city, we plan to influence our neigh-
boring LGUs. (Letana 2016)
mega-project (BCDA 2013c). Similarly, agency officials also reveal 
that currently-farming households will be offered lots, technical 
inputs, and marketing assistance in order to participate as high-
er-value agricultural entrepreneurs in CGC’s urban farming district 
(Casanova 2016). But for those farmers who stand to be immedi-
ately displaced by ongoing construction activities, TWG-formulated 
guidelines allow for furnishing such households a financial sum 
equivalent to a decade’s worth of agriculture-based income, or 
roughly PHP300,000 per hectare on average (Orejas 2016).7
Even though it remains to be seen whether each of these policy 
directions for local populations will be sustained, their commu-
nication toward established communities within CGC areas 
already appears to have diffused earlier opposition by residents. 
Emblematic of the shift in local sentiment toward the project are 
the views of the local Capas Green City and Proclamation No. 163 
Affected Farmers Association Inc., which from forming barricades 
against the entry of heavy road-construction equipment in April 
2015, have reportedly become CGC supporters a year later on the 
basis of BCDA’s compensation packages and promised future lots 
Fig. 7. CGC Roadworks in Brgy. Aranguren, Capas, where a farmers’ barricade 
was staged in April 2015
 Source: Author
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production of CGC. In contradistinction to ALI’s hegemonic lead-
ership over the Porac LGU, such institutional features of BCDA 
have allowed it to pool governing resources from the private sector 
while nevertheless co-opting their participation into realizing the 
formulated master plan (Ordoñez 2015, 39).
This advantaged position of BCDA can be traced to several 
conditions. On one hand, the 1992 Bases Conversion law furnished 
the authority with a purportedly “very powerful” charter, which 
granted BCDA monopoly-level control over all the lands that 
have come under its jurisdiction (Bingcang 2016). In turn, BCDA’s 
resulting status as a monopoly merchant of strategically-located, 
commercially-attractive base lands has vested BCDA with a firm 
initial bargaining position against the private sector (Casanova 
2016). Beyond being the monopoly seller/lessor of lands in its 
portfolio, however, BCDA has been simultaneously capacitated 
by Bases Conversion Act with significant development, adminis-
trative and regulatory powers over the territories that fall under 
its jurisdiction, furnishing it with multiple bases with which to 
influence private developers beyond bidding. Though it does not 
always maximize such powers, BCDA nonetheless can function 
as an effective city government for CGC, with all the powers and 
capacities that are normally afforded to LGUs (Ordoñez 2015, 63; 
Bingcang 2016). Finally, not to be underestimated has been the 
overall efficacy of BCDA’s technocratically-oriented bureaucracy, 
which has been undergoing systematic capacity-building efforts at 
both domestic and international venues, particularly in the areas 
of urban planning and management (Letana 2016).
Though initially formulated in market-liberal mores, a fortui-
tous set of circumstances has enabled the agency to consolidate 
a new hybrid regime of spatial production over CGC with both 
market-oriented and quasi-“strong state” characteristics. Mirroring, 
in this sense, forms of selective government steerage of market 
dynamics that have been observed in East Asian developmental 
states like Singapore (Wade 1990, 30), such efforts by BCDA have 
conformed with the parameters laid down by developers’ revenue 
imperatives, even while seeking to bend their trajectories to other 
purposes. As echoed by BCDA’s president development:
While this desire to foster the capacities of CGC-adjacent 
LGUs has been shared among informants, another motive also has 
been at play: namely, isolating the project and BCDA’s business 
partners from political undercurrents associated with intra-state 
incoherence and the Philippine electoral cycle. BCDA empha-
sizes that a defining feature of its urban development model has 
involved shielding “private partners from political risks, such as 
those associated with changes in administration” (BCDA 2013, 5); 
likewise, among the agency’s responsibilities in its JV agreements 
for CGC are commitments to assisting developers in politicized 
processes such as securing all required government approvals, 
supporting the acquisition of required permits, and coordinating 
with LGUs (BCDA 2015b, 6–7). In this vein, BCDA’s interventions 
to strengthen LGU capacities directly contributes to the agency’s 
efforts to minimize political disruptions against CGC’s develop-
ment. By projecting its influence over other government bodies, 
and working to reconfigure key aspects of their operations along its 
own model of technocratic governance, BCDA has installed wider 
institutional and relational buffers against a backdrop of person-
alized state dynamics which have regularly threatened investors’ 
needs for regulatory predictability (McKay 2006). 
But if certain features of BCDA’s governance approaches are 
technocratic in orientation, the earlier discussion also indicates 
that BCDA and CGC’s institutional complexion cannot be reduced 
to standard neoliberal mores. Indeed, the rigor with which the 
agency has formulated its master plans and harnessed them 
in bidding procedures suggests that BCDA possesses unusually 
authoritative features in the landscape of Philippine state anemia, 
which has merited its designation by some observers as a nascent 
“strong state technocracy” (Cardenas 2016). BCDA officers them-
selves express awareness of the distinct institutional facets of the 
agency, noting that good parallels have existed between them and 
Singapore’s Urban Redevelopment Authority (Letana 2016), which 
have been critical in honing a balance in the city-state between 
developmental and neoliberal policy regimes (Haila 2015, 15, 
17–18). By this view, BCDA has hybridized market-liberal mores 
with quasi-“strong state” components, which have enabled it to 
exercise relatively greater power over business in governing the 
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Though arrived at by dramatically different means, the forma-
tion of these new urban regimes around both mega-projects 
demonstrates an often-overlooked reality concerning the creation 
of new urban spaces in the Manila MUR: in a context of immense 
spatial and institutional fragmentation, the production of “world-
class” urban spaces has hinged upon the simultaneous produc-
tion of new institutional formations, new governance gestalts, and 
new lattices of power able to underwrite a modicum of stability 
throughout the entire cycle of project implementation. Ironically, 
the overall effect, even when sporting divergent forms of urbanism 
(i.e., enclave vs. inclusive), has been a diminution of public power 
over nominally-democratic institutions in favor of governance 
regimes ultimately directed by corporate elites or state technocrats.
Power and Neoliberal Governance in a 
Changing Peri-Urban Landscape
Beyond their immediate locales, what do the development 
processes of Alviera and CGC tell us about the workings of urban 
governance and spatial power in the Philippines and other similar 
countries today? While the outcomes of the Alviera and CGC 
episodes have partly reaffirmed narratives concerning the weak 
nature of the Philippine state (Hutchcroft 1997), the salience of 
patrimonial elites in urban governance (Shatkin 2006; Murphy and 
Hogan 2012), and the deleterious impacts of neoliberal restruc-
turing (Bello et al. 2014), other processes in both case studies are 
less straightforward. Can BCDA’s current position of institutional 
strength and its newfound commitment to “slum-free” urbanism be 
easily interpreted as a weak state apparatus or as an exclusionary 
purveyor of neoliberal-urban regimes? Likewise, while some 
informants speculated as to possible links between ALI’s oper-
ations and LLHI’s more coercive actions (Carranza 2016), might 
not the firm’s reported long-term avoidance of patrimonial tactics 
(Batalla 1999), along with the consistent avowals of all interviewed 
Porac LGU officials that “Ayala is different” (Lansangan 2016; dela 
Cruz 2016; Tapang 2016) make it problematic to lump it together 
with more consistently rentierist fractions of Philippine business? 
Amidst such disparities, it becomes difficult to presume the cohe-
siveness of a single regime of neoliberalized spatial production in 
BCDA is not simply a developer. We are not a market player. We are the 
market, actually. We set the market. We set the platform for developers, 
infrastructure builders, utility provider, businesses to come in. We are the 
stage, basically. (Casanova 2016)
The Scalar Powers of Neoliberal Urbanism
Alviera and Clark Green City: these mega-projects have not only 
served as nascent growth poles in a broader wave of peri-urban 
expansion—they have come to fore as the frontiers of new constel-
lations of power amidst Philippine neoliberal urbanism. Both 
ventures, after all, have hinged on intensive public-private modes 
of collaboration, while also harnessing a wide range of market-
friendly mechanisms. Similarly, they have gained immensely 
from entrepreneurial pressures affecting LGUs, which has firmly 
incentivized local state officials to grant considerable influence to 
mega-project developers—to the extent, at times, of delegating to 
them entire urban governance functions.
Whether due to efforts to assemble governing coalitions 
spanning power-brokers from the highest echelons of national 
politics to municipal levels, to governance augmentation inter-
ventions for affected LGUs, to measures that reshuffle the scalar 
features of their respective institutional jurisdictions, and finally 
to the creation of new institutional and quasi-legal instruments, 
the landscapes of power within the municipalities have under-
gone dramatic shifts, effectively placing ALI and BCDA at the 
commanding heights of the local production and governance of 
urban space. To achieve its self-professed role as acting govern-
ment in Alviera, ALI has projected hegemonic leadership over the 
moribund Porac LGU—leveraging upon its reputational capital 
as the Philippines’ premier property developer and its assembled 
forms of expertise to harness spontaneous appeals for assistance 
and/or augmentation for advancing its commercial prerogatives. 
In the case of CGC, the exceptionalist composition of BCDA, which 
has endowed it with monopoly ownership as well as administra-
tive, regulatory, and development control over its land assets, has 
granted the agency tremendous leverage to serve as a de facto 
steerer, not only of urban governance in adjacent LGUs, but also 
of private sector partners.
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instruments, new forms of expertise and relational know-how, new 
networks and coalitions of actors, and new institutional capacities 
for urban development and governance. In this vein, the exercise 
of power by ALI and BCDA in developing their mega-projects has 
generally been less about the assertion of directly repressive forms 
of control, and more about “gaining and fusing a capacity to act” 
(Stone 2015, 115) otherwise dispersed across a mélange of actors. 
The purveyors of power, in such a context, have instead revealed 
themselves to be more predisposed toward eliciting the consensual 
collaboration of various forces in a broader governing coalition, 
often by leveraging upon existing assets and incentives for coop-
eration, strategically adapting to relational dynamics at diverse 
settings, creating new knowledge, and improvising new institu-
tional approaches toward potential allies. Among neoliberalized 
mega-projects, one might say, the dynamics of power themselves 
have become entrepreneurial.
These come with two caveats, however. On one hand, this 
entrepreneurialized power to convene coalitions, along with the 
collective capacities that they represent, still admits of hegemonic 
control. As ALI’s and BCDA’s influencing tendencies have shown, 
even in the midst of adaptation to coalitional allies and scalar 
settings, decision-making control over the frame of mega-project 
development has remained squarely among main project propo-
nents. Whether formalized or not in a master plan or other instru-
ments, both organizations have demonstrated that they retain veto 
leverage to reject disruptions to anticipated project trajectories as 
well as strategic policy processes. This can mainly be traced to both 
organizations’ possession of crucial resources (e.g., land, expertise) 
whose removal would effectively jeopardize the mega-projects at 
stake and all forms of gain (whether real or imagined) that other 
allies might expect from their implementation.
But if power has been productive in the development of Alviera 
and CGC, it has also remained profoundly territorial, having been 
engrossed in the management, manipulation, and policing of 
spatio-institutional boundaries. This has been borne out in the 
varieties of spatial politics involved in the mega-projects: similar 
to elsewhere, the reshuffling of scalar formations that has accom-
panied these ventures has been instrumental in rendering the 
Philippines. As it seems, a variety of actually-existing neoliberal 
regimes have been at play in the Philippines—sharing the employ-
ment of a continuum of market-oriented practices of spatial 
production, yet differing substantially as to their exact regulatory 
contents, development trajectories, and political imperatives.
One could even go further by contending that these subnational 
varieties of neoliberalism have been an outcome of neoliberal state 
rescaling all along. With the unravelling of nationally-standardized 
spatial governance frameworks, the shift toward decentralized 
and area-customized governance regimes that have accompa-
nied processes of neoliberalization has also granted subnational 
jurisdictions, especially cities, far more incentive and flexibility 
to experiment with new policy and institutional arrangements, 
whether to shore up local economic opportunities or to pursue 
other policy objectives (Peck, Theodore, and Brenner 2009). Though 
the adoption of such entrepreneurial arrangements has tended to 
intensify patterns of uneven spatial development between and 
within cities, it has also tended to encourage diverse, place-spe-
cific forms of governance across different locations (Brenner 2004, 
474), most especially among municipal governments jockeying for 
better competitive positions. While the variety of such subnational 
governance formations may be far from unlimited, it is likely that 
more plural currents have obtained around different urban sites 
and around different organizational units than has tended to be 
recognized in Philippine urban governance discussions.
A second insight concerns how power relations have been 
employed in the process of mega-project development in the 
Manila MUR. Indeed, both Alviera and CGC have witnessed the 
realignment of power networks that have obtained in their host 
localities, which has been embedded in new scalar gestalts of 
governance. Yet seen from another angle, these great transfor-
mations of scalar and institutional realities affirm the established 
Foucauldian precept that “power is productive” (Foucault 1978)—if 
with an added twist.
For power, after all, in the process of developing Alviera and 
CGC has been eminently productive: the power to produce urban 
space in the peri-urban periphery has itself produced new insti-
tutional norms and arrangements, new legal and quasi-legal 
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not even have they been the beachheads of perhaps the most ambi-
tious wave of city-building to have swept the country since the 
aftermath of World War II. In truth, their development provides a 
privileged panorama for discerning finer shifts in the fragmented 
landscapes of governance, and indeed, the birth and expansion—
out from the ashes of neoliberal adjustment—of a cornucopia of 
new regulatory orders and scale-manipulating instruments for 
creating and maintaining them. How will these new governance 
gestalts develop in the years to come, both in themselves and with 
one another? And what relationships will they come to establish 
with nominally-democratic governing orders whose jurisdictional 
authority they have subtly yet indelibly reconfigured—if not already 
displaced? The eventual responses to these questions will prove 
to be of historic importance not just to the maneuverings of state 
and capital in neoliberalized contexts, but also to the prospects 
of still-struggling, still-evolving movements of non-elite forces to 
claim universal and democratic rights to the city.
Endnotes
1. The material for this chapter was originally written in mid-2016, prior to the 
election of the present administration of Rodrigo Duterte. Circumstances 
since then have prompted some outward changes in the two mega-pro-
jects being studied—particularly with the rebranding of Clark Green City as 
“New Clark City.” Despite such developments, there is little reason to believe 
that the fundamental governance dynamics discussed in this chapter have 
altered in the period since then up to the time of writing.
2. Other signal features of market-friendly urban governance were adopted 
by means of national legislation over the years. In 1992, major responsibil-
ities for socialized housing were ceded over to the private sector with the 
passage of the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA), even as net-
worked, public-private forms of urban infrastructural development were 
enabled through the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Act of 1990, and its 
amendment in 1993 (Bello et al. 2014, 92–96, 203).
3. Porac is the municipality with the largest land area in Pampanga province, 
most of which has been dedicated to forest reserve (45.50 percent), lahar 
(26.73 percent) and agricultural (22.89 percent) uses (Municipal Govern-
ment of Porac 2016, 2, 27, 29). Lahar areas stand out prominently as the 
town was one of the most devastated in the CL region by the eruption of Mt. 
Pinatubo in 1991 (Municipal Government of Porac 2016, 1).
4. According to the Index, Economic Dynamism covers data mainly related to 
business registration, employment, and financial institutions; Government 
territorial lines of authority far more “porous, unstable, and prone 
to transgressions and transformations” (Swyngedouw 2000, 68), 
giving rise to ambiguous institutional boundaries between nomi-
nally-public and non-democratic forms of urban governance. Yet 
in the case of both projects, such institutional porosity has hardly 
translated into a free flow of governance influence: though ALI 
and BCDA differ on the formation of spatial enclaves, the concur-
rence of both organizations on the need to shield project processes 
from political risks and the commensurate need to shoulder paltry 
LGU activities, alludes to the heightened importance of managing 
institutional boundary-setting dynamics that have prevailed in 
both projects’ relations with established government units. To 
the entrepreneurial power of assembling governance capacities 
is welded the police power to territorially exclude a spectrum of 
undesired forces within the Philippines’ fragmented universe of 
urban governance. 
No doubt, it can be argued that the use of these institutional 
boundary-setting practices has been an integral part of both 
Alviera and CGC’s aims to produce spaces that deliver upon the 
preferences of global investors, modernized fractions of Philippine 
business, and prospective clientele from the middle-class upwards, 
who have all been documented to be predisposed to more program-
matic forms of governance (McKay 2006; Hutchcroft 1998). But 
more importantly, the use of this territorial power in both projects 
has foregrounded an expanding domain of political and regula-
tory activity in which the production of prime urban space has 
become intertwined with the creation and policing of institutional 
territories.9 Distinct, if still linked, from the creation of spatial 
enclaves, this rapprochement has hardly been a foregone conclu-
sion: ultimately, it has hinged on the accumulation of “transversal 
bordering capabilities” (Sassen 2013, 69) and their deployment to 
exclude disruptive processes from the institutional geographies of 
re-scaled governance formations. 
Viewed before these trends, the emerging mega-projects investi-
gated in this chapter become even more remarkable. Not only have 
these mega-projects been among the largest and most ambitious of 
their kind in the Philippines today; not only have they been at the 
heart of contemporary efforts to inject new strands of urbanism; 
34 Great Transformations 35JERIK CRUZ
Bases Conversion and Development Authority, March 8. Accessed June 2, 
2016. http://www.bcda.gov.ph/news_articles/show/516. 
Dumlao, Doris. 2014. “Ayala Land Investing P90B in Porac Estate.” Philippine 
Daily Inquirer, May 19. Accessed May 21, 2016. http://business.inquirer.
net/192163/ayala-land-investing-p90b-in-porac-estate.
———. 2014. “Ayala to Build Nuvali-style Development in Pampanga.” Philip-
pine Daily Inquirer, May 26. Accessed May 19, 2016. http://business.inquirer.
net/171458/ayala-to-build-nuvali-style-development-in-pampanga.
iMoney.ph. 2015. “Beyond Metro Manila: The 4 Best-buy Cities for Property.” 
GMA News Online, April 22. Accessed May 14, 2016. http://www.gmanet-
work.com/news/story/474342/money/beyond-metro-manila-the-4-best- 
buy-cities-for-property.
Japan International Cooperation Agency. 2014. “Philippine Government Adopts 
Manila Transport Plan Based on JICA Study.” Japan International Coopera-
tion Agency, September 25. Accessed April 29, 2016. http://www.jica.go.jp/
english/news/field/2014/140925_03.html.
———. n.d. “Roadmap of Transport Infrastructure Development for Metro Ma-
nila and its Surrounding Areas: Main Points of Roadmap.” Japan Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency. June 2, 2016. http://www.jica.go.jp/philippine/
english/office/topics/news/c8h0vm00008wr871-att/140902_01.pdf.
Jimenez-David, Rina. 2014. “Development After Lahar.” Philippine Daily  Inquirer, 
September 1. Accessed May 24, 2016. http://opinion.inquirer.net/78644/de-
velopment-after-lahar.
Lamudi Philippines. n.d. “Lamudi Real Estate Report 2015.” Lamudi Philippines, 
April 25, 2016. http://www.lamudi.com.ph/research/whitepaper-2015/.
Locsin, Joel. 2014. “PNoy, NEDA Board Give Clark Green City Master Plan the 
Thumbs Up.” GMA News Online, May 30. Accessed June 2, 2016. http://www.
gmanetwork.com/news/story/363373/money/companies/pnoy-neda-
board-give-clark- green-city-master-plan-the-thumbs-up. 
Magkilat, Bernie. 2016. “BCDA, Japan’s JOIN Ink Joint Venture Agreement for 
Clark Green City Dev’t.” Manila Bulletin, March 8. Accessed June 2, 2016. 
http://www.mb.com.ph/bcda-japans-join-ink-joint-venture-agreement-
for-clark-green-city-devt/. 
———. 2016. “Clark Green City: PH’s Next Frontier.” Manila Bulletin, March 6. 
Accessed June 2, 2016. http://www.mb.com.ph/clark-green-city-phs-next-
frontier/. 
Magturo, Daphne. 2014. “ALI Sees Alviera Pampanga Generating P15B in Rev-
enue.” BusinessWorld, September 23. Accessed May 24, 2016. http://www.
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 Manila Standard, March 3. Accessed May 23, 2016. http://manilastandard-
today.com/real-estate/159230/ali-sets-to-create-new-economic-frontier-
for-ph.html.
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Efficiency to transparency and accountability, public finance, performance 
recognition, business responsiveness, and basic government services; and 
infrastructure to road network, basic utilities, and registered vehicles (Na-
tional Competitiveness Council 2014).
5. Even while professing reserve at the prospect of establishing new PPPs 
within Porac, for instance, the town’s municipal planner still justified ap-
pealing to ALI’s help in formulating the municipality’s development plans 
on the following basis:
 “Right now we’re already talking that we need their help because their 
development, they’re the ones who know how to do it. . . . If only they could 
sponsor it, they could help us with our Comprehensive Development Plan, 
because they’ll be the center [of development]. . . . If Porac can possibly 
become a city, if Porac really progresses, if their development is realized, 
it’s only [then] that we will be given a chance for Porac to be uplifted.” 
(Lansangan 2016 trans.)
6. Tellingly, one of the very first CGC initiatives being undertaken has entailed 
the construction of 2,000 units of affordable rental housing across 279 hec-
tares of land for approximately 85,000 minimum wage earners, as part of a 
partnership between BCDA and the Philippines’ Home Development Mutu-
al Fund (Remo 2015).
7. On the other hand, while BCDA’s guidelines for non-farming residents were 
still being finalized as of writing, the authority’s agreement in the TWG has 
been not to relocate any resident that had been dwelling in the area by the 
time that BCDA conducted a household census in 2013 (Casanova 2016).
8. The winner of the competition—the Singaporean branch of world-leading 
design firm AECOM—was selected on the basis of its flexible, more com-
pact and mixed-use design, as well as its clearer allocation of lands for fu-
ture expansion (Letana 2016; Amojelar 2015).
9. The embedding of CGC’s entirety in an SEZ-denominated space and the si-
multaneous incorporation of a PEZA zone in Alviera are particularly sym-
bolic illustrations of this.
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HAVING TRAVELLED WITH EASE across the different coun-
tries of nineteenth-century Europe, José Rizal experiences “el 
demonio de las comparaciones” upon his return to Manila. This 
“demon” no longer allows him to see Manila without constantly 
been reminded of the cities in Europe. This “demon of compar-
ison” created a form of double-consciousness, such that Rizal 
could not help but experience the rising German capital Berlin 
without simultaneously thinking of then provincial Manila and 
vice versa. His perspective on Manila had changed. It is this story 
that serves as the title of Benedict Anderson’s essay collection on 
Southeast Asia, The Spectre of Comparisons. It is this epistemolog-
ical vantage point that allowed Rizal to judge Spain’s backwardness 
from the perspective of more progressive European nations in the 
way the Spaniards judged the Philippines (B. Anderson 1998, 229). 
Thinking about public spaces and writing about the city of Manila 
cannot be disentangled from that epistemological vantage point. 
Not only nations are imagined communities—to refer to Benedict 
Anderson’s famous phrase—cities are, too. Talking about cities is 
thus largely shaped by our own experience and imagination. 
This essay deals with the political significance of the urban 
landscape of Manila. Key to this analysis is how the notion of the 
“public” plays out with respect to the polarity of private and public. 
The shape of the public is an index of the democratic organiza-
tion of any larger community; without a public, an essential aspect 
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